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2.1 Introduetion 
As President Kennedy already knew, success has many fathers and failure few. By 
almost any economie Standard, the postwar economie development of Japan can be 
characterized as a success. Very few indusf:rialized countries boast a similar 
persistent combination of low unemployment, low inflation and high economie 
growth. Not surprisingly, this success has become the main topic of many studies 
in economics, and in other disciplines such as political science and sociology 
as well. Various theoretical schools try to claim the success by declaring it in 
accordance with their own analytical exercises and resulting conclusions. 
Consequently, as will be argued in this chapter, the field of Japanese economie 
studies has become a battleground of academie conflicts, characterized by 
significant polarization and politization. These conflicts result mainly from 
prevailing differences of opinion regarding two fundamental issues. 
First, Japanese economie studies has, like other fields in economics, been hit 
by the controversy between activist and non-activist policies, the contrast 
between belief in government intervention and faith in the f ree market1. In 
section 2.3, this debate will be clearly reflected in the opposing views of the 
interventionist and market schools, with the interventionists drawing the 
conclusion that the alleged successful Japanese experience with industrial 
policy offers important lessons not only for developing countries, but for the 
industrialized world as well2. Furthermore, the debate between government 
intervention and free market dominance as main characteristic of the Japanese 
economie system can be found in the analyses of economists whose main work has 
no linkage with this specific economie system whatsoever, but whose general 
conclusions are applied to it eagerly. A case in point is Milton Friedman, who 
asserted on American national television: "The image of the Japanese having had 
an industrial policy which explains their success is a myth. The f act of the 
matter is that the most successful components of Japanese development proceeded 
against the advice of the government"^. 
Second and most importantly, conflicts have come to surface regarding the 
explanations and usefulness of mainstream economie theory with respect to the 
Japanese economie system. The critics, predominantly originating from political 
and social sciences, but also including some prominent Japanese academie econo-
1
 Morris-Suzuki (1989), p.195. 
2
 See for example Johnson (1982), (1988) and (1993), his remarks in 
Tokyo Business Today (1991), and Tyson ( ) [Tyson (1993) and Johnson. 
Tyson and Zvsman (1989") checkenl . 
As quoted from Johnson (1988), p.1. 
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mists, blame traditional economics for being unrealistic and narrow, putting to 
much emphasis on markets and neglecting the importance of comparative institu-
tional differences, history, culture and social factors^. Without any doubt, C. 
Johnson, the leading proponent of the interventionist school and a political 
scientist, is the most critical analyst of contemporary Japanese economie 
studies. In his sharp attack on the state of af f airs in the contribution of 
economics to a better understanding of the Japanese economie system, Johnson 
(1988), p.1-2, refers to "... the growing inability of the three main schools of 
economie theory - neoclassical, Keynesian, or Marxist - to explain the achieve-
ments of Japan and the Japanese type economies. ... What has to be stressed is 
that the Western world is without any widely agreed-upon theoretical explanation 
for Japan's postwar economie performance and that professional economics in the 
United States has virtually abandoned the effort". According to Johnson, Japan's 
postwar economie development poses a significant number of anomalies for 
"Western" economie theory, a development in which specific institutional 
characteristics were of great importance-'. To be able to explain the Japanese 
economie system, Johnson (1988) emphasizes that economics needs to incorporate 
explicitly the study of institutions and institutional differences, and therefo-
re should move towards the study of political economy. 
The criticism of Johnson has been shared in recent years by a growing number of 
authors who also expressed the importance of the explicit inclusion of insti-
tutional characteristics in studies of the Japanese economie system, the lack of 
attention for these aspects in traditional economie analyses of Japan, and the 
consequent need to move from economics to political economy, which consequently 
has received more attention in Japanese economie studies. For example, Kumon and 
Rosovsky (1992) describe this development as follows:"... The movement from 
economics to political economy is significant; it certainly means more than 
simply the desire to include political factors in understanding Japan's current 
position and future prospects. The recent revival of political economy was a 
direct result of increasing dissatisfaction with the perceived narrowness and 
* This sharp attack on mainstream economie interpretations of the 
Japanese economy has been counter-attacked in Evans (1990), where it is 
asserted that "Standard economie analysis has a good record of understan-
ding the maj or elements of the Japanese economy". 
-> Examples of these anomalies are according to Johnson (1988), p.2, 
persistent large trade-surplusses despite strong currency appreciation and 
transfer of savings to industry not through capital markets but through 
banks; specific institutional characteristics are the existence of "... 
Keiretsu, unenforced antitrust laws, administratively guided banks, company 
unions, virtually nonexistent dividends for shareholders, and closed 
markets" [Johnson (1993), p.55]. 
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lack of realism that characterized much of traditional economics, with its 
almost exclusive emphasis on markets and simultaneous deemphasizing of history 
and institutions. The revived political economy approach intends to reintroduce 
the missing ingredients: primarily government, but other social forces as 
well"°. They continue that "... it was fairly clear that modern Japanese 
economie history could not adequately be analyzed without reference to public 
policy and institutions. As Japanese economie success was becoming more evident, 
it also became increasingly obvious that many assumptions of liberal and 
orthodox economics yielded - in Japan - counterintuitive results. After all, 
here was a country in which, to cite but a few examples, oligopolies were 
strong, labor mobility low, government interference high, and yet the efficiency 
of the economy in terms of output, productivity growth, and competitive power 
could not be doubted". 
The movement towards political economy is also recognized in Morris-Suzuki 
(1989). In her view, the common feature linking contemporary Japanese economists 
is "... their rejection of the conventional, relatively narrow interpretation of 
'economie' phenomena. Each in his own way has tried to overstep the boundaries 
that have confined most modern economie thought, in Japan and elsewhere, and to 
reintegrate the economie with aspects of the political, the social, and the 
cultural. ... there appears to be an attempt to rediscover lost elements of that 
earlier concept of 'political economy'..." [Morris-Suzuki (1989), p.195]. As 
will become clear in the following sections, numerous recent studies, such as 
Murakami (1982), Okimoto (1989), Kumon (1992) and Murakami and Rohlen (1992), 
are punctuated with this criticism of the traditional theories and explanations 
of the Japanese economie system'. The criticism on mainstream economics is by 
some Japanese economists translated in reaching for uniquely Japanese cultural 
explanations of the postwar Japanese economie development. For example, Mori-
shima (1982) explains Japan's economie success in terms of Confucianism and 
Shintoism; in the work of Y. Murakami, Japanese collectivism is put versus 
Western individualism, the former making the difference in Japan's succesful 
0
 Kumon and Rosovsky (1992), p.2-3. 
' For example, Murakami (1982), p.4, notes that "..., if we attempt to 
compare the Japanese economy with other advanced industrial economies, we 
will have to pay closer attention to the rigidity of each legal framework, 
range, and mode of government intervention, strength and persistence of 
underlying values, and so forth. If we focus only on the purely economie 
aspects of the Japanese economy, we will overlook what I believe are the 
Japanese economy's important features, those that distinguish it from other 
industrial nations' economies". 
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economie development°. 
As will become clear in the following analysis, these two major controversies in 
the field of Japanese- economie studies, i.e. the contrast between belief in 
government intervention and faith in the free market and the criticism on 
mainstream economics in neglecting comparative institutional differences, are 
embedded in different interpretations of the Japanese political economy. 
The political economy can be defined as the set of relationships between the 
political system, the government bureaucracy and the economie system. This 
thesis will focus explicitly on the characteristics of the relationship between 
the Japanese government bureaucracy and the economie system, a relationship wich 
is predominantly discussed in the so-called political economy literature. In 
this sense, the Japanese political economy is important for two reasons. 
First, knowledge of the various interpretations of the Japanese political 
economy is indispensable to understand the relationship between the government 
bureaucracy and the economie system, especially the nature and level of govern-
ment intervention in the economy. Section 2.3 will be devoted to various 
interpretations of this speciflc relationship. Since monetary policy is one of 
the major parts of government economie intervention, study of the political 
economy establishes the theoretical framework for understanding its fundamental 
characteristics. 
Second, analysis of the Japanese political economy is necessary to understand 
the different interpretations of the alleged relevance of informal aspects as 
institutional characteristics of the public-private sector relationship within 
the Japanese economie system. This debate will be presented in the next chapter. 
With great emphasis it has to be mentioned again that the attention for inter-
pretations of the Japanese political economy in this chapter is inspired by the 
alleged negligence of fundamental institutional characteristics of the Japanese 
economie system in traditional economie analyses. This study is not interested 
in the specifics of the Japanese political system, and the relationship between 
the political and economie systems. However, because discussions of the funda-
ö
 See Morishima (1982) and Morris-Suzuki (1989), p.176-177; For 
Murakami's interpretation see Morris-Suzuki (1989), p.185-187. Other 
studies which stress the importance of cultural values in explaining the 
Japanese economie system are Okimoto (1989) and various contributions in 
Kumon and Rosovsky (1992). There exists a vast amount of literature 
emphasizing the cultural uniqueness of Japan, collectively named as 
Nihon^inron. Elaborate coverage of this literature is presented in Mouer 
and Sugimoto (1986). 
6 
mental institutional characteristics of the Japanese economie system, such as 
the nature of the economie system and the importance of informal factors, and 
the relationship between the Japanese bureaucracy and economy are predominantly 
concentrated in the rapidly growing literature on the Japanese political 
economy, this literature is relevant for this study and has to be discussed. 
Therefore, to put the different theories with respect to the Japanese economie 
system and the alleged relevance of informal aspects in the right perspective, 
the next subsection will analyze various interpretations of the Japanese 
political economy. 
2.2 The Japanese Political Economy 
With respect to Japan, various studies from a political economy perspective have 
been conducted*. They mostly focus on the influence of various interest groups, 
especially big business and political parties, on the formulation and consequent 
implementation of Japanese economie policy, the role of the economie bureaucracy 
in the economie system and the relation between various ministries. In these 
studies, generally five models of the Japanese political economy can be distin-
guished: the "Japan, Inc.", bureaucracy-led, pluralistic, consensual policy and 
pluralistic network models10. 
2.2.1 "Japan, Inc." Model 
The first school to be discussed is the "Japan, Inc." model, the Japanese 
version of the power elite model1-'-. "Japan, Inc." or the ruling-triad model 
captures the notion that power in Japan is concentrated in the hands of a select 
group of leaders from big business (Zaikai), the government bureaucracy and the 
Liberal Democratie Party (LDP) fJimintoo), the political party that since World 
War II, with exeption of a small period, has been in power in parliament and 
9
 For a excellent survey of studies regarding various apects of the 
Japanese political economy see Yamamura and Yasuba (ed.) (1987) and 
Inoguchi and Okimoto (ed.) (1988). With respect to the Japanese financial 
system, Home (1985), Hamada and Horiuchi (1987), Hollerman (1988) and 
McCall Rosenbluth (1989) contain political economy approaches. Political 
economy interpretations of industrial policy are for example Johnson 
(1982), Eads and Yamamura (1987), Kosai (1987) and Okuno-Fujiwara (1991). 
1 0
 The broad structure of this classification is based on Kosai 
(1987), Okimoto (1988), Okimoto (1989), Noble (1989) and Murakami and 
Rohlen (1992). Murakami (1987) follows a different interpretation. Only 
main and most recent schools will be discussed. No attention will be paid 
to the corporatist and neo-corporatist interpretations, which are central 
in Nester (1990), but which is dismissed by Okimoto (1988) in generating 
convincing results in Japanese political economy studies. Furthermore, it 
has to be stressed that according to various authors, for example Kosai 
(1987) and Hollerman (1988), the Japanese political economy passed through 
different stages after WWII. These dynamic interpretations will also not be 
discussed. Finally, against the background of the growing interest and 
rapid developments in theories of the Japanese political economy, this 
classification is without any doubt not complete and outdated when publis-
hed. For example, a recent approach stresses the dominance of the political 
world over the bureaucracy. This approach, exemplified in Ramseyer and 
McCall Rosenbluth (1993), will be discussed briefly in the next chapter 
(subsection 3.3.2.1). 
Okimoto (1988), p.307. 
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govemment*-2. This power elite is, due to common educational and other social 
backgrounds, shared policy objectives and membership of the technostructure-", 
strongly coherent and united. The "Japan, Inc." school sees Japan as a monoli-
thic controlled society, apolitically managed by its technostructure, with large 
interest groups as organlzed labour excluded from policy formulation. Taira and 
Wada (1987) is a relatively recent study that supports this vision. The "Japan, 
Inc." interpretation has lost most of its traditional support, but some elements 
can still be found in recent studies. For example, Upham (1987), p.16, stresses 
the "... the informal give and take that is the social glue holding the busi-
ness -bureaucracy-LDP coalition together". In his view, "... what Japan's 
tripartite elite had tried to accomplish, and what they have in large part 
succeeded in achieving, is the maintenance of a style of policy formation and 
implementation that emphasizes bureaucratie leadership exercised through 
informal processes"^. This emphasis on the role of the bureaucracy is the 
central assumption of the next interpretation of the Japanese political economy, 
the bureaucracy-led model. 
2.2.2 Bureaucracy-led Model 
A second model stresses the importance of the bureaucracy in the economie 
development of Japan. This school is referred to as the bureaucracy-led, 
statist, state-led or state-dominant school, and is the conventional model used 
for political economy analyses of Japan^. The bureaucracy-led model, with 
well-known representatives Chalmers Johnson, T.J. Pempel and J. Zysman, stresses 
the bureaucracy as the main power in Japan^°. According to Kosai (1987), the 
bureaucracy-led school takes as its main assumptions that "... Japan pursues a 
single, consistent target (for example, modernization) and that a consensus on 
1 2
 Okimoto (1988), p.307. Zaikai means literally financial world 
(circles). According to Hollerman (1988), the term refers to elite business 
leaders who exercise special influence in politics and the government 
bureaucracy. In the elections of 1993, the LDP lost its majority in 
parliament, and Japan got a coalition cabinet without participation of the 
LDP. 
•*-•* Kosai (1987), p.558. As most important policy objective the deve-
lopment of Japan towards an advanced country is mentioned. The technostruc-
ture is the formalization of a strong interrelated network "... where ex-
bureaucrats often become either business or political leaders". 
1 4
 Upham (1987), p.21. 
1 5
 Okimoto (1988), p.309, and Kosai (1987), p.557. 
See Johnson (1982), Pempel (1982) and Zysman (1983). 
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broad goals exists among elitist bureaucrats"1'. Where the "Japan, Inc." 
school regards power in Japan exercised and divided by three more or less equal 
sectors, i.e. big business, the bureaucracy and the LDP, the bureaucracy-led 
model sees the bureaucracy as the far most dominant and powerful force with 
respect to the formulation of Japanese economie policy. This view is also shared 
by Ram-seyer (1985), p.638, who notes that "...., modern Japan is largely 
governed by an elite and fundamentally nondemocratic bureaucracy. The ministries 
rather than the legislature draft the laws and determine basic national policies 
for the future". 
2.2.3 Pluralistic Model 
Another model for interpretation of the Japanese political economy stresses the 
existence and influence of pluralistic interests on economie policymaking and 
consequent policy implementation. One approach has been put forward by Muramatsu 
and Krauss (1987). According to these authors, the Japanese political economy 
should not be interpreted as overwhelmingly dominated by the bureaucracy or a 
"ruling triad" of bureaucracy, big business and LDP^ -°. Instead, Muramatsu and 
Krauss stress the existence of pluralist elements in the process of Japanese 
policymaking: interest groups are allowed to operate and exert influence, but 
only through patterned channels in an institutional structure consisting of 
strong bureaucracies which regulate the political activities of these groups-'-'-
. This model of patterned pluralism sees Japan only marginally different from a 
fully pluralist democracy, with "... the marginal difference is the "patterned" 
element - organized interest groups must observe a more or less formal procedure 
in presenting their views or making political input through specified chan-
nels"'". According to Muramatsu and Krauss (1987) and Kosai (1987), the model 
of patterned pluralism with controlled influence of interest groups fits pretty 
well the contemporary Japanese political economy. The belief that the Japanese 
political system is more or less comparable with pluralist democracies is shared 
even stronger by Tresize and Suzuki (1976):"... the Japanese political scène is 
pluralist, competitive, and subject to inherent and effective checks and 
balances. In essentials, Japanese politics do not differ from politics in other 
1 7
 Kosai (1987), p.557. 
1 8
 Muramatsu and Krauss (1987), p.537. 
1 9
 Okimoto (1988), p.308, Kosai (1987), p.558, and Muramatsu and 
Krauss (1987), p.537. 
2 0
 Kosai (1987), p.558. 
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democracies"21. Another version of the pluralist interpretation has been 
introduced in Aoki (....)• Aoki sees the Japanese government bureaucracy in two 
inseparable roles, i.e. "... that of semiautonomous rational regulator (policy-
maker) and that of a quasi agent of specific interests in the economy"22. The 
bureaucracy plays an important role in the social bargaining process between 
various interest groups: various constituent interests have access to various 
bureaucratie entities which act as the quasi agents of these interests. The 
conflicts between these interests "... are arbitrated through intrabureaucratic 
coordination"23. Against the background of the role of the government bureau-
cracy, Aoki speaks in terms of administered pluralism. The pluralist interpreta-
tion has also been put forward in Hollerman (1988), who stresses the importance 
of the processes of liberalization and internationalization in generating a 
"Japan, Disincorporated" phase in the post-war Japanese political economy. This 
phase, which started in the 60's, culminated in the period 1980-1984, during 
which in Japan "...the world saw a spectacle of interministerial rivalry, 
bureaucratie infighting, and conflict between government and business"2 . 
2.2.4 Consensual Policy Model 
A fourth school of the Japanese political economy stresses from a cultural 
perspective the importance of consensus and consensual policy-making in under-
standing the political economy of Japan. This view is among others supported by 
Samuels (1987), J.0. Haley [in particular Haley (1989), (1991) and (1992)] and 
Yamamoto (1992), and has been developed into the concept of the societal or 
network state in Okimoto (1988) and the network society in Kumon (1992) and 
Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992)". Okimoto rejects explicit-
p.63. 
2 1
 Tresize and Suzuki (1976), p.782. As quoted from Noble (1989), 
2 2
 Aoki ( ), p.267. 
2 3
 Aoki ( ), p.274. 
2 4
 Hollerman (1988), p.X. 
" Okimoto (1989), p.238. The strong emphasis on consensus in the work 
of Okimoto is shared by Samuels (1987), Yamamoto (1992), Kumon (1992) and 
especially J.0. Haley. Samuels uses the terminology of "reciprocal consent" 
[Samuels (1989), p.19] to put into words the relationship between govern-
ment and private sector in Japan. Yamamoto (1992) describes consensus as 
the binding force in Japanese society, a concept which "... means more than 
law" to the Japanese people [Yamamoto (1992), p.46]. Haley (1989) introdu-
ces the terminology of consensual management which "... encompasses a pro-
cess of governance in which the state may have the authority to intervene 
but not necessarily the power to make unilateral decisions. Governmental 
11 
ly the "Japan, Inc.", bureaucracy-led and pluralistic models of the Japanese 
political economy. Instead, he develops the cultural oriented interpretation of 
the network state, in which the Japanese political-economie system functions on 
the basis of consensus and not in accordance with binding rules and laws^°. 
Japanese society is characterized by emphasis on harmony "... as an integrative 
principle of social organization", with consensus formation "... the concrete 
means by which Japan reaches agreement within the private sector and between the 
private sector and the government"^?. The capacity to reach consensus gives 
the Japanese state its power in formulating economie policy. Not an almighty 
bureaucracy, nor a "triad" consisting of bureaucracy, big business and LDP or 
controlled interest groups determine actual economie policy. According to 
Okimoto, the Japanese state is characterized by a relatively weak bureaucracy, 
bound by cultural constraints, that is forced to develop and sustain consensus 
institutions thus provide the situs for decisions, but officials are not 
the only actors. Rather their influence and capacity to control the 
decisions being made depends upon their ability to achieve consent among 
those most directly affected by the policies being deliberated and whose 
cooperation will be necessary for their effective implementation. It is, 
..., a process of governance by negotiation" [Haley (1989), p.127]. 
However, despite sharing the emphasis on the importance of reaching 
consensus in the government-business relationship, in the next section it 
will become clear that Okimoto and Haley reach totally different conclusi-
ons regarding the effectiveness of industrial policy. 
Z b
 The terminology of the network society had been introduced before 
Okimoto by K.Imai in the meaning of the Information network society [Joohoo 
nettowaaku shakai]. Unlike Okimoto, Imai does not stress the element of 
consensus, but emphasizes the importance of contemporary technological 
innovations in changing the system of industrial society, which necessitate 
the establishment of network relations. See Morris-Suzuki (1989), p.188-
191. 
2' Okimoto (1988), p.313. Okimoto's emphasis on cultural elements as 
harmony and consensus is to a large extent based on the social-anthrop-
ological work of C. Nakane, especially her famous study Nakane (1970). The 
importance of harmony and consensus as specific characteristics of Japanese 
society is strongly doübted in the provocative study by Mouer and Sugimoto 
[Mouer and Sugimoto (1986)], which is a "must" in maintaining some cultural 
objectivity at the outset of one's intellectual quest for the nature of 
Japanese society and economie system. An equally provocative study is 
Ramseyer (1985), in which the alleged consensual character of Japanese 
society is portrayed as the "Consensual Myth". The presence of institutio-
nal barriers to private suits, which have removed virtually all financial 
incentives of litigation in Japan, have perpetuated the myth of Japan as a 
consensual and harmonious society:"..., the scarcity of litigation has 
helped to make plausible the myth of Japan as a consensual and harmonious 
society, and that consensual myth has played a central part in legitimating 
the present form of bureaucractic domination" [Ramseyer (1985), p.643]. 
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with involved parties28. The state prefers to maintain neutrality vis a vis 
interest groups, keep the trust of the groups concerned and use persuasion and 
incentives to achieve its goals. Okimoto emphasizes the voluntaristic character 
of the reactions of the private sector to the bureaucracy2 . Public and priva-
te sectors are connected by numerous networks, whose main function is to reach 
the necessary consensus. In this network state, the separation of public and 
private sectors is blurred, with "... the exceptional organization of each side 
and the highly routinized interaction between public and private actors" greatly 
facilitating policymaking^O. Joining Okimoto is Kumon (1992) and Research 
Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), which also develop a network interpre-
tation of Japanese society. Kumon (1992) departs from a classification of so-
called mutual acts, i.e. acts "... performed by an actor in conscious awareness 
of its external effect on other actors" [Kumon (1992), p.116]. Mutual acts aimed 
at controlling the acts of other actors are called political acts. These 
political acts can be grouped into three combinations of bilateral and unila-
teral acts: acts of threat/coercion, exchange/exploitation and consensus/induce-
ment^l. Kumon adopts the terminology of network for social systems which are 
characterized by consensus and inducement. These network-type social systems can 
be divided into those that are concrete organizations, consequently named 
network organizations, and those that are only societal systems, called societal 
networks32. According to Kumon (1992) and the Research Project Team for Japa-
2 8
 Okimoto (1988), p.313. Haley (1989) and (1991) seems to follow an 
interpretation of an even weaker bureaucracy, which lacks the legal 
instrumentarium to intervene effectively in all circumstances, that is also 
in cases where consensus has not been achieved. 
2
* Okimoto (1989), p.228, mentions that the Japanese state "... cannot 
base its rule on coercion, threats of legal sactions, or unilateral 
imposition of its will on society. When the Japanese state is forced to 
f all back on naked coercion, as it did during the 1930's and the Second 
World War, there arise serious problems of political instability and the 
looming specter of deepseated disorder". According to Haley (1991), p.144, 
the Japanese government has the authority to intervene but lacks the 
coercive legal power to do so:"... The result is a pervasive, ostensibly 
unrestrained capacity to intervene without, however, the means of coercive 
legal control that may be necessary to achieve official aims unilaterally, 
lacking the consent of those affected". 
3 0
 Okimoto (1988), p.315. 
31 Bilateral acts (threat, exchange and consensus) are negotiations, 
or demands with conditions. Unilateral acts (coercion, exploitation and 
inducement) are political acts wthout direct demands or proposals. See 
Kumon (1992), p.116-117, 
Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), p.76. 
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nese Systems (1992), Japanese society can be interpreted, mainly on cultural 
grounds, as a network society: "The distinctive feature in Japan is that net-
work-type social systems ... are granted social legitimacy; not only have they 
spread widely, but many segments of them have been institutionalized either 
formally or informally" [Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), 
p.79]. These studies claim that almost every organization in Japan employs 
predominantly acts of the consensus-inducement type, and consequently are 
network organizations. Furthermore, societal networks, "... whose members are 
groups or people of the same type", for example the goverment bureaucracy and 
private business, are linked by a wide variety of other formal and informal 
networks, which facilitate extensive information-sharing based on personal 
relations". This network society, based on a complex web of large numbers of 
network organizations and societal networks, establishes a kind of "insider 
society", characterized by sübstantial informal, non-transparent exchange of 
information, in order to reach consensus. The resulting mutual interdependence 
of various segments of society, for example regarding the government bureaucracy 
and private business, has "... encouraged the protection of deeply ensconced 
vested interests" [Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), p.66], and 
obstructs the development of a real pluralistic political-economie system. 
Because of the close interdependent relationship between government bureaucracy 
and private business in the consensual policy-network state school, Samuels 
(1987) and Noble (1989) conclude that therefore this school should be interpre-
ted as a "New Japan, Inc." school, a revival of the "Japan, Inc." school-^. 
However, a number of the network state adherents, such as Okimoto and Upham, 
clearly dissociate from the fundamental monolithic characteristics of the 
"Japan, Inc." school. Therefore, the consensual policy-network state interpreta-
tion is separately classified from the "Japan, Inc." school. 
2.2.5 Pluralistic Network Model 
The last model to be discussed is an intermediate mode between the pluralistic 
and network society schools. This model has been developed roughly as the 
-
SJ
 Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), p.79. 
** According to Noble (1989), p.54 and p.69-71, who follows Samuels 
(1987), the approach of Okimoto belongs to this "New Japan, Inc." school. 
Noble's analysis of this school includes among others Young (1984), Boyd 
(1987), Samuels (1987), Upham (1987), and Okimoto (1989). The main reason 
for Noble to use the terminology of "New Japan, Inc." is that according to 
his opinion for its supporters "..., informal but intense links between 
government and business are at the heart of Japanese political economy" 
[Noble (1989), p.69]. 
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informal organization approach in Murakami (1987) and culminated in the social 
exchange model of Murakami and Rohlen (1992)35. This pluralistic network model 
claims that the "... formal institutional structure of the postwar Japanese 
political economy is as pluralistic and competitive as those in other advanced 
industrial countries, but, at the same time, it stresses the importance of 
inclusive, informal networks as a considerable source of coordination, informa-
tion flow, and patterned choices ..."^. Essential is the concept of social 
exchange, which is distincted from economie exchange. Social exchange involves 
the value of social personal relationships, whereas economie exchange focuses 
only on the value of objects3^. in social exchange, the value of the relation-
ships themselves is important:"As social exchange pivots around persons, one of 
its aims is to strengthen human ties via the process of exchange itself. . . . 
because social exchange can deepen in character, it is something to cultivate 
and develop. Doing so generates value"-***. For example, the value of a gift is 
more than just its monetary value. Social exchange, which is mutual beneficial, 
based on personal network relations, and long-term and informally oriented, is 
used to settle problems arising from the instability of the market, which is 
pluralistic and competitive in nature. In other words, social exchange is a 
settlement system to solve the problems arising from economie exchange. Social 
exchange, based on cooperative relationships, became a fundamental characteris-
tic of the postwar Japanese political economy as a result of "... a particular 
cultural legacy and the favorable postwar socioeconomic environment" in Ja-
pan3'. Applied to government-business relations, Murakami and Rohlen use 
social exchange to explain private sector compliance with government's admini-
strative guidance, as will be explained in section 2.3. 
3
-* It has to be mentioned that Murakami also stresses the importance 
of consensus. According to a 1982 study by Murakami, the most vital aspect 
of administrative regulation in post-war Japan was "... the building of 
consensus for voluntary compliance in each industry" [quoted from Haley 
(1991), p.158-159]. However, given the clear evidence of pluralistic 
elements in Murakami's approach, this model is separately classified from 
the consensual-policy school. 
3 6
 Murakami and Rohlen (1992), p.65. 
3
' This distinction is somewhat similar to the interpretation of 
exchange and reciprocation in Kumon (1992). 
3 8
 Murakami and Rohlen (1992), p.73. 
Murakami and Rohlen (1992), p.102. 
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2.2.6 Conclus ions 
These five models of the Japanese political economy described five different 
interpretations of the functioning of the Japanese bureaucratie and the econo-
mie -political systems. Opinions regarding these aspects of Japanese society seem 
deeply embedded in fundamental disagreements how to interpret the basie cul-
tural, political and social characteristics of Japan. It makes a big difference 
in political economy studies if one sees Japan as some kind of pluralistic 
democracy with influential interest groups, or as a country with an almighty 
bureaucracy, largely independent from political influence. Therefore, it is not 
surprisingly that regarding the results of a substantial number of political 
economy studies of Japan the amount of controversies is impressive. As Yamamura 
and Yasuba (1987) conclude, p.2:"... There exists today no single explanation 
for the performance of postwar Japan's political economy that a large majority 
of social scientists accepts as a satisfactory explanation"^". 
As will be explained in the next section, the various interpre tat ions of the 
Japanese political economy have influenced the way of thinking regarding 
economie system and policy in Japan. Purthermore, it will become clear that the 
lack of clarity which dominates the field of Japanese political economy studies 
also casts its shadow on studies of the Japanese economie system. 
*0 According to Johnson (1988), p.:"The relationship between Japan's 
political system and its economie achievements is perhaps the most funda-
mental controversy within the field of Japanese political economy". More 
attention to these controversies is paid in Yamamura and Yasuba (1987), 
Kosai (1987) and Okimoto (1988), and recently Murakami and Rohlen (1992), 
p.63:"Experts seeking to model the Japanese political economy for compara-
tive purposes rarely arrive at the same conclusions Is Japan's 
political economy essentially a system determined by market forces, as most 
economists would argue? Or do other, "non-market," forces (organizational 
strenghts, industrial policies, and culture being three common themes) 
significantly determine outcomes?". 
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2.3 Economie System 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The impressive high growth figures of the postwar Japanese economy have resulted 
in a rapidly growing number of studies on the Japanese economie system. In the 
overwhelming majority of these studies, the attention is focused on the role of 
the Japanese government, in particular the effectiveness of its interventions in 
the economy. The degree of functioning of the market-mechanism is of ten discus-
sed, as well as various forms of government intervention. Especially regarding 
industrial policy in Japan, many studies have been conducted^. As will become 
clear, and in accordance with the array of opinions on the Japanese political 
economy, it has to be stated that the exact nature of the relationship between 
public and private sectors, and the effectiveness of economie policy and its 
contribution to the "Japanese economie miracle", are still subject of discussion 
and controversy, which have been referred to in section 2.1 from a general 
perspective as the contrast between belief in government intervention and faith 
in the free market. 
However, following Zysman (1983), Eads and Yamamura (1987), Balassa and Noland 
(1988), Morris-Suzuki (1989), Noble (1989), Okimoto (1989) and Upham (1991), 
within the context of this debate two established schools, i.e. the interven-
tionist and market schools, and two relatively new intermediate or hybrid 
interpretations can be distinguished^. Xo keep a clear view on the large 
number of studies that will be discussed, figure 2.1 presents an overview of 
theoretical schools and their leading proponents. Furthermore, the various 
interpretations of the Japanese economie system, based on accompanying approa-
ches of the Japanese political economy, are summarised in figure 2.2. 
4 1
 See for example the classic study of Johnson (1982). Among the many 
studies available, some recent examples are Eads and Yamamura (1987), 
Samuels (1987), Suzumura and Okuno-Fujiwara (1987), Uekusa (1987), Friedman 
(1988), Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (1988), Okimoto (1989) and Nester 
(1990). Most studies distinguish per period and industry the specifie 
characteristics and the effectiveness of industrial policy. Given the scope 
of this study, the following presentation will not pay attention to these 
aspects. Furthermore, it has to be stressed that according to various 
authors the Japanese economie system passed through different stages after 
WWII. See for example Hollerman (1988). 
^2 This classification joins the recent excellent study of the World 
Bank (1993), which distinguishes in its explanation of the "East Asian 
economie miracle" the neoclassical, revisionist and market friendly views. 
These views correspond with the market, interventionist and intermediate 
hybrid schools in the following presentation. For the classification of the 
World Bank, see World Bank (1993), p.82-86. 
Figure 2.1 Interpretations of the Japanese Economie System and their Theoretical Supporters 
Economie System Main Theoretical Supporters 
1) Interventionist School: C.J. Johnson, M. Morishima, 
T.J. Pempel, U. Schaede, L. Tyson, 
J. Zysman 
2) Market School: J.0. Haley, R. Komiya, G.W. Noble, 
H. Odagiri, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, 
H. Patrick, G. Saxonhouse, 
K. Suzumura, P.H. Tresize 
3) Consensual Policy 
School: 
S. Kumon, D. Okimoto, F.K. Upham, 
Research Project Team for Japanese 
Systems, R.J. Samuels 
4) Pluralistic Network 
School: 
Y. Murakami, T. Rohlen 
Figure 2.2 Interpretations of the Japanese Political Economy and Economie System 
Political Economy Economie System Public-Private Sector 
1) Bureaucracy-led Model Interventionist School: 
Economie system is competitive 
within parameters set by 
industrial policy 
- bureaucracy leads eco 
development 
- industrial policy ver 
- market-conforming met 
state interventio 
2) "Japan, Inc." Model In its traditional version, not 
relevant anymore 
3) Pluralistic Model 
T II-
Market School: 
Economie system is competitive 
market system 
- market leads economie 
- industrial policy not 
4) Consensual Policy Model 
(Network State Model) 
Separation of public and private 
sectors is blurred: 
Economie system is competitive 
within parameters set by 
business; bureaucracy coordinates 
and enforces if necessary 
- intensive communicati 
tion and consensusbuil 
formal and informal ne 
port economie developm 
- industrial policy rel 
ces f ui through 
- market-conforming met 
5) Pluralistic Network Model 
(Informal Organization 
and Social Exchange) 
Informal organization model, 
social exchange 
(cooperative relationships) 
is used to correct market outcomes 
- informal government i 
in a pluralistic pol.ec 
contributed to economie 
- social exchange and i 
networks correct mark 
and maintain coordina 
- industrial policy suc 
This figure draws partly on Noble (1989), p.72. 
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2.3.2 The Interventionist School 
The first school to be discussed is closely associated with the bureaucracy-led 
interpretation of the Japanese political economy and stresses the existence of 
sübstantial and major government intervention in the Japanese economie system. 
In this school, for convenience's sake called the interventionist school, the 
free working of the market-mechanism and marketforces are of minor importance; 
sübstantial to overwhelming credit is assigned to industrial policy*-*. Japane-
se supporters are found, not surprisingly, mainly among former and present 
staffmembers of the central organization in Japan for industrial policy, the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) fTsuusanshool, supplemented 
by a mere handful of Japanese academies such as Morishima (1982.)**. Main and 
early Western representatives of the interventionist school are Johnson (1982), 
Pempel (1982) and Zysman (1983), foliowed more recently by Tyson (....) and 
Schaede (1992). As has been shown in the previous section on the Japanese poli-
tical economy, these authors focus on the role of the Japanese state, in 
particular the bureaucracy, in achieving the high rates of economie growth 
(strong-state hypothesis). Johnson (1982) develops the well-known concept of the 
developmental or plan-rational state, in which "... the government will give 
greatest precedence to industrial policy"*-'. According to his analysis, in 
states such as Japan that were relatively late to industrialize, the state will 
lead the industrialization process, i.e. will exercise developmental functions. 
Johnson compares the market rationality of the United States economy to the plan 
rationality of the Japanese economy, with the benefit given to the latter*". 
In his work, a central position is given to MITI, an institution for which "... 
*•* Eads and Yamamura (1987), p.423. No attention will be paid to 
various forms of government intervention in Japan's economie system and the 
specific instruments used. For excellent reviews, see Johnson (1978), Home 
(1988) and Okimoto (1989). 
** Examples of these MITI officials are S. Sahashi, quoted in Johnson 
(1982), p.9-10, and Y. Morozumi, mentioned in Okimoto and Rohlen (1988), 
p.80. According to Sahashi, "... It is an utterly self-centered [busines-
sman' s] point of view to think that the government should be concerned with 
providing only a favorable environment for industries without telling them 
what to do". In what Okimoto and Rohlen (1983), p.80, called "A Statement 
Against Free Competition", Morozumi asserts that "... Free competition 
provides neither the most suitable scale nor a guarantee of proper prices. 
Free competition means excessive equipment and low profits. ... Free 
competition has a stifling effect on the economy. We must not allow it to 
be used in distributing the benefits of high growth - prices, wages, pro-
fits". 
4 5
 Johnson (1982), p.19. 
See Johnson (1982), p.18, and Okimoto and Rohlen (1988), p.215. 
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Japan should be given the Nobel Prize"^. pempel (1982) also emphasizes the 
role of the Japanese government in the post-war economie development of Japan. 
He discusses post-war Japanese economie policy in terms of state-led capita-
lism*8. Finally, Zysman (1983) analyzes government intervention in Japan using 
the concept of state led adjustment. The study focuses on the relationship 
between the structure of the state and the structure of the financial system on 
the one hand and the state's capacity for intervention in the economy on the 
other. Based on his classifications of the structural characteristics of state 
and financial system, Zysman claims that Japan is favourable to state interven-
tion49. 
It has to be mentioned that according to the interventionist school Japan is not 
a socialist command or plan economy-'". lts supporters acknowledge to some 
47 Tokyo Business Today (1991), p.20-23 
^
8
 See especially Pempel (1982), chapter two, p.46-89. In more recent 
work, Pempel is moving towards the views of Okimoto and Samuels (section 
2.3.4) of a less dirigistic state. See Pempel and Muramatsu (1993), p.2. 
** According to Zysman (1983), p.300f, dependent on three structural 
characteristics, i.e. the method by which the state recruits the national 
civil service, the extent to which its power is centralized, and its degree 
of autonomy from the legislature, the structure of the state determines 
also its capacity to intervene in the economy. On basis of these characte-
ristics, Zysman claims that Japan is favorable to state intervention. 
Besides the structure of the state, according to Zysman also the structure 
of the financial system determines the capacity of governments to intervene 
in the economy. He links a credit-based or indirect financial system with 
government administered prices with state led growth. Since in Zysman's 
analysis Japan has a similar type of financial system, the Japanese govern-
ment is able to control the system of capital allocation and hence the 
development of the economy. His view is criticized by Okimoto (1989) , 
p.143, and Hamada and Horiuchi (1987), p.224. 
-*" Japan has experience with a weak fora of economie planning. For 
example, during the period 1955-1979, various cabinets introduced nine so-
called national economie plans. These economie plans are developed by the 
Economie Planning Agency (EPA) fKeizai Kikakuchool in cooperation with the 
Economie Council fKeizai Shingikail. They summarize the goals of macro-
economie management of the respective cabinets, but contain no detailed 
descriptions of the implementation of economie policy [Kosai (1987)]. The 
national economie plans should be considered as public statements "... con-
cerning the government's strategie policy objectives and a set of forecas-
ting and projections of key macroeconomic variables. As such, targets and 
projections are not binding on any party, and no attempt is made by the 
EPA, or by any other ministries or agencies, to guide the activities of 
private business in the direction of the plan targets" [Haitani (1986), 
p.269-270], and consequently differ totally from the Gosplan style economie 
plans in the former Sovjet Union. The most recent national plan was 
announced in May 1988 (Five-year Economie and Social Plan "Economie Manage-
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extent the working of competitive forces in Japan, and the need to preserve 
them, but emphasize that the state leads economie growth and development and 
uses the market for achieving its industrial policy goals^l. According to the 
interventionist school, based on the bureaucracy-led interpretation of the 
Japanese political economy, the Japanese economie system is characterized by a 
supposedly relatively high degree of successful government intervention. As will 
become clear in the next subsection, this view is heavily opposed by the market 
school. 
2.3.3 The Market School 
The emphasis on the successful implementation in Japan of industrial policy and 
the strong-state hypothesis of the interventionist school have been strongly 
criticized. lts main opponents follow the neo-classical economie paradigm and to 
some extent the pluralist interpretation of the Japanese political economy-^, 
and denounce sübstantial positive influence of industrial policy and government 
intervention on Japan's economie development-*-*. According to the adherents of 
this neo-classical or market school, the economie success of Japan resulted 
ment within a Global Context"; see OECD (1989), p.39). 
5 1
 Johnson (1982) uses the terminology of market-conforming methods of 
state intervention, of which administrative guidance (Gvoosei Shidoo) is 
the single most important. He states (p.317-318) that "In implementing its 
industrial policy, the state must take care to preserve competition to as 
high a degree as is compatible with its priorities". Furthermore, Johnson 
mentions (p.318) the symbiotic relationship between the market and the 
government in Japan: "One clear lesson from the Japanese case is that the 
state needs the market and private enterprise needs the state; once both 
sides recognized this, cooperation was possible and high-speed growth 
occured". Also Pempel (1982) stresses (p.xvii) the relation between 
government intervention and competitive forces in Japan: ". . . , government 
actions have been very much at the core of the bulk of Japan's public 
policles, in economics as well as elsewhere. At the same time, it makes no 
sense to ignore the importance of competitive private enterprises". 
Finally, Zysman (1983) joins the former two with respect to the relations-
hip between Japanese state and market, and discusses this relationship in 
terms of controlled competition:"There is every evidence of intense compe-
tition between firms but that competition seems to be directed and limited 
both by state actions and by the collaborative efforts of the firms and 
banks themselves". 
5 2
 This belief is not always explictly stated but seems to be impli-
citly assumed. See Noble (1989). Tresize and Suzuki (1976) emphasize 
clearly that both economie and political systems can be interpreted as 
being competitive and pluralistic. 
5 3
 See Eads and Yamamura (1987), p.423, Noble (1989), p.60-65, Nester 
(1990), p.13, and Upham (1991), p.324. Johnson (1982), p.9, refers to this 
school as the "no-miracle-occurred" school of analysis. 
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mainly from the working of f ree market forces. Government intervention has been 
marginal, often ineffective and consequently leaving the market mechanism to 
operate efficiently^. For example, H. Patrick has been quoted as saying "... 
I am of the school which interprets Japanese economie performance as due 
primarily to the actions and efforts of private individuals and enterprises 
responding to the opportunities provided in quite free markets for commodities 
and labor. While the government has been supportive and indeed has done much to 
create the environment for growth, its role has often been exaggerated"". 
Other Western supporters of the market school are among others Trezise (1983), 
Haley (1986), (1989) and (1991), Noble (1989), G. Saxonhouse and Beason and 
Weinstein (1993). Japanese supporters are for example Kosai and Ogino (1984), 
Suzumura and Okuno-Fujiwara (1987), R. Komiya and various other contributors in 
Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (1988), Okuno-Fujiwara (1991) and Odagiri (1992)56. 
The supporters of the market school are predominantly economists: according to 
Aoki (1987), mostly Journalists and non-Japanese political scientists adhere to 
the view that the "... Japanese economy is a bureaucracy-led coherent system", 
but generally economists see the bureaucrat's role as only complementary to the 
function of the market mechanism-'?. Furthermore, the main conclusion of the 
elaborate study on post-war Japanese industrial policy, published in Komiya, 
Okuno and Suzumura (1988), states that "... All the participants in this project 
recognize that, excluding the brief period immediately after the end of the war, 
the foundation of rapid growth was competition operating through the price 
3
* Noble (1989), p.53, and Eads and Yamamura (1987), p.423. 
" in Johnson (1982), p.9. Other Western advocates of the neo-classi-
cal school are P.H. Trezise [see Eads and Yamamura (1987), note 1, p.636], 
Haley (1986), Horne (1988), Noble (1989) and Evans (1990). For example, 
Home (1988), p.168, concludes that "... The picture, then, is not one of a 
control economy, but of an economy attuned to market forces in many areas, 
although subject to intervention at different times for different reasons". 
5 6
 For example, Kosai and Ogino (1984), p.120, note that "... far from 
being the outcome of the planning of a small elite, Japan's high growth 
rate was achieved only as the result of the high rate of saving by the 
people, by their will to work, and by the vigorous efforts of Japan's 
entrepreneurs" [As quoted from Morris-Suzuki (1989), p.133]. Suzumura and 
Okuno-Fujiwara (1987), p.69, conclude:"... Does it follow, however, that 
the actual regulatory activities by the Japanese government with the 
expressed purpose of keeping "excessive competition" under control are 
legitimate and theoretically defensible? Our answer is emphatically negati-
ve" (By the way, the claim in Noble (1989), p.57, that these authors 
concluded "... that MITI's efforts to reduce "excessive competition," ... 
were actually theoretically justifiable", seems to be incorrect). 
Aoki (1988), p.265. 
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mechanism and a flourishing entrepreneurial spirit it can even be said 
that the course of the history of industrial policy in the principal postwar 
periods . .. has of ten been that the initiative and vitality of the private 
sector undermined the plans of the government authorities to try to utilize 
direct intervention in the nature of "controls" "•* . Another and final example 
of the market school is presented in Odagiri (1992), who strongly denies the 
importance of government involvement in the post-war economie development of Ja-
pan:"... It is not government policies but a management system favouring growth 
strategies and innovation, and its interaction with intra-firm and inter-firm 
competition that have been the central forces behind Japan's economie achieve-
ment"59. 
In brief, the interventionist approach, embedded in the bureaucracy-led politi-
cal economy interpretation, emphasizes a successful role of industrial policy 
and government intervention in post-war Japanese economie growth, with only 
minor attention for market forces. The exactly opposite view is being hold by 
the market school, focusing on the market mechanism, and denying substantial 
contributions of state led industrial and other economie policies to economie 
progress in Japan. This school interprets the Japanese economie system as being 
fundamentally determined by market forces. 
The differences between both schools look irreconcilable. However, two relati-
vely new approaches, which follow the criticism of the market school on the 
strong state hypothesis of the interventionist school, but stress the effec-
tiveness™ of Japanese industrial policy and the use of market-conforming met-
hods of government intervention of the latter, have been developed. These 
intermediate or hybrid modes of the Japanese economie system are based on the 
political economy interpretation of consensual policy and the pluralistic 
network model. 
2.3.4 Hybrid Interpretations 
The first intermediate mode between the interventionist and market schools is 
based on the consensus oriented political economy school, with the societal, 
relational or network state, introduced by D. Okimoto, being its main proclai-
Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (1988), p.553. 
Odagiri (1992), p.278. 
Okimoto (1989), p.230, refers to "apparent" effectiveness. 
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mer. In this netwerk school, the strength of the state "... is derived from the 
convergence of public and private interests and the extensive network of ties 
binding the two sectors together"°^. The societal state is "... usually invol-
ved in coordinating the processes of consensus formation; and consensus, 
painstakingly arrived at, provides legitimation for state intervention in the 
activities of the market economy"62. Networks of communication and negotiation 
between public and private sectors are essential to formulate economie poli-
Cy63 xhat is, the interaction between public and private sector takes place 
through a vast network of foraal intermediate organizations, such as industrial 
associations and public corporations, in combination with informal policy net-
works6^. According to Okimoto, these formal and informal networks constitute 
the main intervention route of Japan's central bureaucracies in the economie 
system, and contribute to the relative success of Japanese industrial policy. 
Within this framework, regarding industrial policy the developing and sustaining 
by MITI of a consensus approach between involved parties is essential65. This 
industrial policy of MITI differs from "... market-oriented models in its 
emphasis on the mutual interdependence of govemment and private industry"66. 
This policy differs also from the interventionist school in placing less 
emphasis on the vision and power of MITI as explanation for the relative success 
of Japanese industrial policy [Okimoto (1989), p.xv]. As mentioned before, in 
Okimoto's analysis the implementation of this policy takes form"... through 
market-conforming methods of intervention"6'. That is to say, according to 
Okimoto (1989), "... Japanese government officials believe that the market 
should be given as much leeway as possible to function", but with the constraint 
that it is positively structured "... in ways that improve the likelihood that 
6 1
 Okimoto (1989), p.145. 
6 2
 Okimoto and Rohlen (1988), p.214. 
6 3
 Noble (1989), p.69. He continues:"Within these networks, the 
bureaucracy remains important for structuring conflict and discussion and 
providing information, even if it is not necessarily the major source of 
policy innovation or an authoritative decisionmaker". 
"* These formal intermediate organizations "... extend the tentacles 
of state power throughout the private sector" [Okimoto (1988), p.315]. 
Informal policy networks will be discussed in the next chapter. 
6 5
 Noble (1989), p.54. 
6 6
 Kumon (1992), p.110. 
6 7
 Okimoto (1989), p.50. The similarity with Johnson (1982) is stri-
king. 
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industry-specific goals will be achieved"**8. 
The concept of the network state has been foliowed in Kumon (1992) and Research 
Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992) to analyze, among other things, the 
structure of the government-business relationship. Following the analysis of 
subsection 2.2.4, the Japanese network society and economy consists of numerous 
intertwined network organizations and societal networks. Regarding network 
organizatlons, individual firms are often members of large informally organized 
business groups, commonly called Keiretsu°', defined by Kumon as semi-formally 
organized transindustrial network organizations. Other examples of network 
organizations are alumni associations, associations of people bom in the same 
home town and industry associations. Societal networks, whose members belong to 
specific "circles" or "worlds" (Kai), such as the political, business, bureau-
cratie and educational "worlds", each of which is divided into various "sub-
worlds", are the other major components of the Japanese network society. These 
"worlds" or "subworlds" are composed of various kinds of network organizations. 
For example, "... manufacturers of synthetic fibers form a network organization 
called the Association of Synthetic Fiber Hanufacturers, which is a member of 
the Federation of Textile Industries, which, in turn, is a member of the Japan 
Federation of Economie Organizations (Keidanren)"70. The different societal 
networks are connected by a series of formal and informal network organizations, 
such as the legally established ministerial advisory or deliberation councils 
(Shingikai), composed of government officials and representatives of the private 
sector, and other non-legal based private counseling groups or study groups for 
ministers'1. The result is a network system of decentralized network organiza-
6 8
 Okimoto (1989), p.11, and p.48. He concludes on p.12: "... MITI 
officials are sceptical that a strictly hands-off posture will yield outco-
mes that coincide with sectoral priorities, public interests, and national 
goals. To derive optimal outcomes, the visible hand of the state must work 
in conjunction with the invisible hand of the market". And on p.49: "..., 
the Japanese government sets a longer, more concrete, and more ambitious 
agenda of goals that it feels the self-regulating market cannot be counted 
on to achieve. ... The Japanese leave less to chance". 
°
9
 For clear definitions of various types of business groups in Japan, 
see for example Imai (1992), p.198-230, and Odagiri (1992), p.166-197. 
7 0
 Kumon (1992), p.125. 
'1 Kumon (1992), p.126, and Research Project Team For Japanese Systems 
(1992), p.80-81. The report of the World Bank (1993), p.181-188, values the 
deliberation councils highly in contributing to Japanese economie growth by 
facilitating communication and cooperation between public and private 
sector. The importance of these Shingikai is also emphasized in among 
others Johnson (1978) and (1982), Park (1986), Upham (1987) and Okimoto 
(1989). 
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tions, intertwined with "... unofficial business, political, and bureaucratie 
circles, informal intra- and inter-industrial networks, and deliberative 
councils and research groups in central government", predominantly institutiona-
lized on an informal basis'2. 
The second hybrid interpretation, as regards its orientation located between the 
interventionist and market schools, is based on the political economy interpre-
tation of the pluralistic network school, which is basically more pluralistic 
oriented than the consensual policy school. This interpretation was initially 
developed as the informal organization approach in Murakami (1987). According to 
Murakami, Japanese industrial policy "... is a successful example of how to 
combine two conflicting principles, competition and intervention, in order to 
achieve maximum economie growth"73. The pluralistic dimension of the pluralis-
tic network school is emphasized by Murakami (1987), p.39, where it is said that 
"... All indications show that both the market mechanism and parliamentary 
democracy have been at work in postwar Japan, bringing about fierce competition 
and visible conflicts in many parts of society". After WWII, the Japanese 
government managed to keep a delicate balance between regulation and competi-
tion. Government intervention was minimal and informal or indicative, that is 
not legally enforceable. This weak guidance, generally named administrative 
guidance (Gyoosei Shidoo), established a framework in which competition could 
function. Murakami calls this kind of competition "compartmentalized competi-
tion"'^. This mode of compartmentalized competition was accompanied by the 
7 2
 Research Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), p.103. To 
explain the fundamental characteristics of the Japanese economie system, 
Kumon (1992) follows the classification introduced by Karl Polanyi, who 
distinguishes between three types of social organization of economie 
activities: reciprocity, redistribution and exchange. According to Kumon 
(1992), a significantly large proportion of economie activity in Japan is 
not characterized by exchange but by reciprocation, based on long-standing 
and stable relations of mutual trust, which require close personal relati-
ons and well-developed networks. Reciprocation can be exemplified by the 
existence of the Keiretsu: for example, the employees of the group's 
corporate member firms drink the beer of the group's brewery, whilst the 
employees of the brewery deposit their allowances with the group's bank. 
Example taken from Gerlach (1992), p.XXI, a study which also pays attention 
to the approach developed by Polanyi. 
7 3
 Murakami (1987), p.51. 
Murakami (1987), p.50. 
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existence of a pluralistic political system7^. in a "follow up" study, Muraka-
mi developed in close collaboration with T. Rohlen the social exchange model, in 
which the government-business relationship [i.e. industrial policy] in postwar 
Japan is presented as an example of social exchange, and consequently can be 
explained by "... a theory of implicit give-and-take operating in a long-term 
framework in which both government and private firms get what they want"'". In 
this relationship, the following elements were essential. First, the relation-
ship was informal and long-term, multi-issue based, expressed in effective 
administrative guidance. Furthermore, participants shared the belief that 
"excessive competition" should be avoided (presence of cognitive consensus), and 
therefore accepted this administrative guidance in general. Another essential 
feature was the intragroup impartiality: member firms of a specific industrial 
association were treated equally by the government bureaucracy. Finally, to 
safeguard the consensus reached, entry to this group was also controlled by the 
use of administrative guidance. The resulting effectiveness of industrial policy 
depended on a combination of a "... favorable environment of economie coopera-
tion", i.e. consensus to prevent "excessive competition", and a particular 
Japanese cultural tradition based on cooperative collectivisme'. 
As has been stated in subsection 2.2.4, the central focus on the importance of 
consensual policymaking in the network society interpretation of D. Okimoto is 
supported in by J.0. Haley, who interprets the intervention of the Japanese 
government in the economie system as consensual management'". However, Haley 
'^  The post-war Japanese political economy, an "... uniquely Japanese 
system", was according to Murakami "... characterized by a combination of a 
pluralistic system (market or parliament) and administrative intervention 
(bureaucracy)". The pluralistic interpretation of the Japanese political 
economy in Murakami's analysis is being explained in Murakami (1987), p.56-
71. Although Murakami clearly follows the pluralistic interpretation of the 
Japanese political economy, in Noble (1989), p.55, his work is positioned 
in the state-led or developmental state interpretation of the Japanese 
political economy. 
7 6
 Murakami and Rohlen (1992), p.91. 
7 7
 Murakami and Rohlen (1992), p.95, p.82-83. 
7 8
 See Haley (1989), (1991) and (1992). Haley (1989), p.126-127, 
explains consensual management as follows:"... Government involvement in 
Japan in terms of authority tends to be as unlimited in scope as in a 
command economy, yet the power of officials to coerce or control is 
substantially more limited than in either a regulated or command economy". 
In this interpretation, "..., distinction between "public" and "private" 
blur and "regulation" takes on new meaning, as those apparently subject to 
governmental direction gain a significant and often determinative voice in 
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is extremely critical of Okimoto's conclusion of the "apparent" effectiveness of 
Japanese industrial policy: "What is described today as a successful "industrial 
policy" carried out by an elite corps of Japanese technocrats can be more 
accurately characterized as a series of ad hoc adjustments to immediate economie 
needs and circumstances by government and business cooperating when their 
interests coincided, but often in conflict as they pursued their own individual 
aims"79. According to Haley, as a result of the lack of formal, legal powers, 
the Japanese economie bureaucracy was forced to use informal administrative 
guidance to intervene in the economie system. And this administrative guidance 
was so weak that the f ree working of market f orces could survive:"..., the 
predominance of administrative guidance as a regulatory form for government 
intervention in the economy ... has helped to preserve a competitive market 
economy by maximizing the freedom of individual firms over economie decisions 
although behind the veil of pervasive governmental direction. Japanese postwar 
economie achievement can thus be credited in part to administrative guidance 
because it ensured the failure of a bureaucratically set agenda""0. Thus, 
Haley is clearly a supporter of the market school. 
A scholar whose approach is relatively difficult to classify is F.K. Upham. As 
mentioned in section 2.2.1, Upham (1987) starts from the "Japan, Inc." model. 
Furthermore, he also refers to the presence of pluralistic elements, i.e. 
influence of interest groups:"Interest groups abound and are enormously success-
ful in Japan in general and in industrial policy in particular" [Upham (1987), 
p.200]. However, in the development of Upham's work, the "consultative consen-
sual character" of the public-private sector relationship becomes the dominant 
line. The process of negotiation, the "... close, informal, collaborative 
relationship between the bureaucracy and business" is according to Upham the 
lifeblood of Japanese industrial policy8^. The separation between public and 
private sectors is blurred to such an extent that "... it may be wrong even to 
think in terms of government intervention in the economy" [Upham (1991), p.342]. 
the process of formulating and implementing policy" [Haley (1991), p.144]. 
Haley emphasizes the importance of the market:"... industries ... become 
more constrained by the market than the government" [Haley (1989), p.130], 
and ".. . , the pressures of the marketplace - be it political or economie -
become determinative in the formation of policy and its implementation" 
[Haley (1991), p.168]. 
7 9
 Haley (1991), p.153. 
8 0
 Haley (1986), p.108. As quoted from Noble (1989), p.65. 
Upham (1987), p.201-203, and Upham (1991), p.342. 
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In this important respect, Upham's work belongs to the consensual policy school. 
Therefore, he is Incorporated in that school. 
2.3.5 Summary 
The various interpretations of the Japanese political economy and economie 
system were summarised in figure 2.2. The "Japan, Inc." interpretation is in its 
traditional version dismissed by various authors as being no longer relevant for 
the present Japanese political-economie structure8^. Furthermore, in the 
figure the approach of J. Haley, who follows the paradigm of consensus of the 
consensual policy/management school but clearly supports the market school 
conclusions regarding the Japanese economie system, is located between these 
interpretations. 
°
l
 For criticism of "Japan, Inc.", see for example Johnson (1982), 
Kosai (1987), Okimoto (1988) and (1989). 
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2.4 Conclusions 
The discussion of the literature of the Japanese political economy and economie 
system leads to the following conclusions. 
First, it should be noticed from the analysis of the interpretations of the 
Japanese economie system, summarized in figure 2.2, that in recent years the 
network approach has gained significant popularity. The growing application of 
network analysis to the Japanese economie system is a direct consequence of the 
dissatisfaction among a number of scholars with the traditional theories and 
interpretations and their lack of attention for institutional characteristics, 
as described in section 2.1. As has been demonstrated, the studies Okimoto 
(1988) and (1989), Kumon (1992), Murakami and Rohlen (1992) and the Research 
Project Team for Japanese Systems (1992), all stress the importance of network 
relations in the Japanese economie structure. Social network analysis has been 
developed in anthropology and sociology, and saw a major expansion in the 1960s 
and 1970s when its application was extended to other sciences as well, among 
others economics". One field of Japanese economie studies which has adopted 
the network approach for its analytical exercises is the field of industrial 
organization, clear examples being Nakatani (1991), Gerlach (1992) and Imai 
(1992)° . Another area where attention for network relations is growing is the 
study of the relationship between government and private business, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. 
Second, the analysis shows clearly the existence of fundamentally different 
interpretations of the Japanese economie system, based on accompanying and 
similar views of the political economy, state and society. These differences, 
which are basically different views of the role of the government in the 
development of economie markets and private business, i.e. of economie policy, 
result in completely different frameworks for economie analysis. It makes a big 
ai
 Scott (1988), p.53-54. In anthropology and sociology, the concept 
of network is defined as "... the totality of all units connected by a 
certain type of relationship" [Kumon (1992), p.112-113]. In economics, the 
approach of interpreting intercorporate relations as social networks is 
getting more and more support. See for example Scott (1988) and Imai 
(1992). 
°^ Nakatani (1991) introduced Japan's "network capitalism", based on 
two pillars of a "Keiretsuka" economy and a system of interlocking share-
holding [Johnson (1992), p.8]. In Gerlach (1992), the attention is focused 
on informal intercorporate alliances, which have pervaded much of the 
Japanese economy. Imai (1992) uses the terminology of corporate networks to 
define the industrial organizations and connections between business firms 
in modern Japan, culminating in a theory of network industrial organiza-
tion. 
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difference whether one sees the Japanese economy as part of a developmental 
state, guided by the economie bureaucracy, or as a market economy, embedded in a 
pluralistic model, guided by the forces of supply and demand. It makes a big 
difference whether one presupposes the economie bureaucracy endowed with 
almighty powers and near perfect foresight of the interventionist school, or the 
relatively powerless bureaucracy of the consensual policy school, which has to 
coordinate and negotiate with private industry to be able to implement its 
policies. It makes a big difference whether public and private sectors are 
diametrically opposed to each other, as the market school does, or presented as 
a symbiotic network system, their borders blurred by interrelated formal and 
informal networks, as the network state interpretations do. In short, it makes a 
big difference which specific school one accepts to formulate the basic assump-
tions of economie analysis, assumptions which determine its final conclusions. 
The interpretation of the market school traditionally and predominantly has been 
the departing framework in the contributions of economists to Japanese economie 
studies. However, during the last decade this orientation has been criticized by 
the interventionist school, and more recently by the network state interpreta-
tions . 
Especially the interventionist's view, propagated in the academie community 
mainly by C. Johnson and supported in the media by journalists like K. van 
Wolferen and J. Fallows and the former Counselor for Japan Affairs to the U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce CV. Prestowitz, collectively named the revisionists, has 
been extremely critical of the market school". The controversies regarding 
the basic characteristics of the Japanese economie system have resulted in 
polarization and politization in the field of Japanese economie studies, 
sometimes reduced to narrow and simplistic "pro" or "contra" Japan classi-
fications. In this sense, the market school is being interpreted as "pro": the 
Japanese economie system is basically determined by market forces, there are no 
"unfair" government interventions and trade barriers, and consequently Japan 
should be treated in equal terms. On the other side, the interventionist school 
and their revisionist supporters are typified as the "contra" Japan movement: 
they argue that Japanese capitalism is basically different from western capita-
list systems, advocate managed trade and industrial policy, and support a tough 
03
 A summary of their views is presented in U.S. News & World Report 
(1990), p.54-55. 
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policy line with regard to Japan86. The polarization can be exemplified by a 
number of statements. For example, C. Johnson called Columbia University, the 
alma mater of H. Patrick who is one of the proponents of the market school, for 
its alleged pro-Japanese viewpoints the "Columbia Geisha School of 
Economics"87. Johnson also doubted the integrity of his market school oppo-
nents by accusing them of being on Japanese payroll. On the other side, the 
revisionists are portraid as "Gang of Four" and "Japan-bashers", and accused of 
"McCarthyism"88. This polarization is also present in the political field. 
Under the Bush administration, G. Saxonhouse, one of the leading proponents of 
the market school, was member of the Council of Economie Advisers. The Clinton 
administration appointed L. D'Andrea Tyson, who is one of the recent main 
defenders of the interventionist line, as head of the Council of Economie 
Advisers. Against the background of this polarization and politization, one's 
own research is quite easily labeled as being either "pro" or "contra" Japan. 
This stigmatization is highly regrettable, because it obstructs objective 
research8'. 
Third, the studies which criticized economics of being unrealistic in the sense 
of neglecting important institutional characteristics emphasize the importance 
of informal factors. Clear examples are Johnson (1982), Okimoto (1989), Kumon 
(1992) and Murakami and Rohlen (1992). Therefore, in the next chapter, the 
presence and relevance of informal factors as institutional characteristics of 
the püblic-private sector relationship in Japan will be discussed. The classifi-
cation of the various interpretations of the Japanese political economy and 
economie system established in this chapter will form the guideline for this 
analysis. 
8
° Johnson (1993), p.65, interprets Japanese capitalism as a "... 
combination of a strong state, industrial policy, producer economics, and 
managerial autonomy". Johnson talks even in terms of Asian capitalism, 
which "... seems destined to lie at the center ... of what economists will 
teach their students in the next century". 
8 7
 Tokyo Business Today (1991), p.21. 
8 8
 See Choate (1990), p.153-154. 
8
' An excellent overview of the ongoing debate between interventiona-
lists and market economists is presented in Yamamura (1990), where the 
former are referred to as structuralist pessimists, and the latter are 
divided in market school utopians and market school optimists. 
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